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COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT ON THE
INTERNET: CAN THE WILD, WILD WEST BE
TAMED?
The Internet,1 the phenomenon of the twentieth century, seems
easily comparable to the old Western American frontier of the
ninetheenth century. The frontier was a new, uncharted territory
that offered new freedoms never before experienced. It also
provided new dangers, and fostered the attitude of "every man for
himself." Because these new freedoms bordered so close to
anarchy, the long arm of the law was needed to regulate them.
The United States successfully brought the entire wild frontier
under its control. A century later, our Congress has chosen not
only to neglect the goal of bringing law and order to the wastelands
of the Internet, but to take the exact opposite approach toward this
new frontier.2
The Internet is a new medium of communication unlike any
other before it, but its capabilities leave it open to widespread
abuse.3 If the integrity of our federal laws is to be preserved, they
must apply to the Internet as they do to all other media of
communication.4
These laws certainly include the area of copyright infringement.
The Internet allows information to be sent anywhere at any time,
and not always with the rightful owner's permission.5 Internet
'The Internet is a worldwide computer network governed by no single legal or
government entity. Mary Ann Shulman, Comment, Internet Copyright
Infringement Liability: Is an Online Access Provider More Like a Landlord or a
Dance Hall Operator?, 27 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 555, 556 n.5 (1997). It
links millions of computers in corporations, schools, and other entities together
through telephone wires. Religious Technology Center v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1365 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
2 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998).
3 "With the growing popularity of the Internet, incidents of online fraud, theft,
piracy, and infringement have grown correspondingly." April M. Major,
Copyright Law Tackles Yet Another Challenge: The Electronic Frontier of the
World Wide Web, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER& TECH. L.J. 75, 75 (1998).
' "[T]he necessity of online regulation requires that lawmakers be flexible and
innovative in their approach to preventing and remedying legal injuries that have
been cognizable in other contexts for decades." Id. at 75-76.
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Service Providers (hereinafter ISPs) 6 are the entities that have the
most control over the flow of information, yet they disavow any
affirmative responsibility to protect ownership rights.
Furthermore, courts do not always find them directly liable for the
infringement of those rights,7 and Congress recently limited their
liability for copyright infringement by passing the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.8 Has Congress forgotten its
constitutional power to promote "science and useful arts?" 9
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act exempts ISPs from
monetary liability for the five distinct functions of providing
conduit service, caching, providing web space, linking, and taking
down allegedly infringing materials in good faith.' It was meant
to settle an ongoing dispute between copyright owners and ISPs
over what level of liability, if any, should be imposed on ISPs for
copyright infringement." On one side, the ISPs expressed concern
that they would be held liable for the actions of subscribers, even if
they were unaware of those actions.'" Arguing against holding
ISPs directly liable for the actions of third parties, they compared
their situation to that of telephone companies which are not held
liable when customers send infringing faxes through the phone
lines.'3 They also argued that monitoring subscribers' actions
6 There are two types of ISPs: local access providers and commercial online
services. Access providers lease their facilities to allow their customers to
subscribe to a regional network that links to the Internet (such as Netcom and
PANIX). Shulman, supra note 1, at 559 n.26. Commercial online services
provide Internet access, but additionally provide content services through their
own network for their subscribers (such as America Online and CompuServe).
Shulman, supra note 1, at 559 n.26.
7 See, e.g., Religious Technology Center v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Cal. 1995).
8 Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202(a), 112 Stat. 2860, 2877-86 (1998).
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This provision states, in pertinent part: "The
Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
10 § 202(a), 112 Stat. at 2877-86.
"H.R. REP. No. 105-551 (II) (1998), available at 1998 WL 414916.
12 Joan Gilsdorf, Comment, Copyright Liability of On-Line Service Providers,
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would be an invasion of privacy and would also be impossible to
accomplish. 4
Still other ISP advocates argued that ISPs should be entirely
exempt from any liability." This argument once again uses an
analogy to telephone carriers, since they operate as "mere conduits
for digital transmissions."' 6  While the telephone carriers may
qualify for exemption under existing law, 7 ISPs never would have
been able to claim the same form of exemption because most
Internet communications are not the same kind of "secondary
transmissions" that are sent through phone or fax."
Without any exemptions for copyright infringement liability,
ISPs would be governed by the same liability as all other media. 9
The ISPs and their supporters believed their argument was the one
truly supported by the Constitution,2' insisting that the "free
exchange of ideas and facilitating the progression of art and
science, not the maximizing the return for creators," was the true
goal of copyright.2' Contrary to their interpretation of the
141d. at 631-32.
Is Id. at 632.
161d.
17 17 U.S.C. § I 1 (a)(3) (1994). This statute provides, in pertinent part:
The secondary transmission of a primary transmission
embodying a performance or display of a work is not an
infringement of copyright if... the secondary transmission is
made by any carrier who has no direct or indirect control over
the content or selection of the primary transmission or over the
particular recipients of the secondary transmission, and whose
activities with respect to the secondary transmission consist
solely of providing wires, cables, or other communications
channels for the use of others ....
Id.
11 Gilsdorf, supra note 12, at 633.
19 Id.
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
21 Gilsdorf, supra note 12, at 633. Additionally, they argued that increased
copyright protection would force them out of business, or at the very least lessen
the ready availability of certain information. Id. at 633-34. They also objected
to the idea that those ISPs not forced out of business would regulate what their
subscribers did, as a "kind of privatized Big Brother." Id. at 634. Apparently,
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Copyright Clause, both the goals of free exchange and protection
of original works are consistent with each other, as the framers
intended.'
However, copyright owners had their own legitimate fears as
well. They felt that less copyright regulation on the Internet would
"result in a loss of control" over their posted copyrighted
creations.' They argued that if copyright owners were not given
adequate protection for their works, and they consequently lost
"control over their works," they would no longer have the
incentive to create, thus inhibiting their desire to contribute to the
Internet.24
Additionally, ISPs are uniquely position able to control and
enforce copyright laws in a way that copyright owners cannot.25
They can implement and execute their own anti-infringement
policies, warn their subscribers against infringement, and "use
hardware and software tools to determine if infringing works have
been posted. 2 6  Moreover, they are able to receive notice of
infringing activity, and are "in the best position to quickly stop
infringing activities" as they occur on their systems."
Copyright owners still encountered a division in their ranks --
some believed that traditional copyright liability should apply, with
no exemptions, and others thought that only strict liability should
be imposed."8 However, both groups opposed any exception for
ISPs claiming to be "mere conduits," likening such exemotion to a
"protected telephone monopoly. 2 9
Furthermore, providing an "innocent infringer" defense for ISPs
would undermine any real protection copyright holders could
most support when those who express those creations receive a certain amount
of protection for them.
2 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
23 Gilsdorf, supra note 12, at 634.
24 Id.
2 Id.
26 Id. at 634-35.
27 Id. at 635.
28 Id. Copyright holders agreed that while clarification of the existing
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expect to obtain.30 Since ISPs are also the main beneficiaries of the
growth of the Internet, they should accept their responsibility for
the infringing action that occurs, and not be encouraged to look the
other way, allowing copyright infringement to take place on their
systems.
31
Now that Congress has spoken, it would seem that the ISPs have
had their way, and that protecting creators' copyrights is not
important enough. Since this new legislation has provided ISPs
with a qualified immunity that is unavailable to other forms of
media, and has left many copyrighted works unprotected, it should
be held unconstitutional. 32 Those in favor of this new law would
justify this immunity because the Internet is more difficult to
control, due to its lack of physical borders.33 But no matter what
the medium, copyrighted works deserve the same protection that
they are entitled to in all other forms of media, and those who
operate the medium are obligated to ensure against infringement.
This article will describe the application by federal courts of all
three levels of copyright infringement to the Internet. Part I will
provide a general overview of the Internet. Part II will discuss
the different theories of copyright infringement, and analyze how
and why contributory and vicarious liability have been applied to
website owners and bulletin-board operators.35 Part III will
analyze the case law that existed prior to the enactment of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act.3 6  Part IV will dissect the
recently enacted amendments, analyze the effect they could have
on Internet-based intellectual property, and explain why they
should be struck down.37
o Id. By the same token, strict liability applies to information providers such
as bookstores and photocopying services. Id. at 636. They also promote "the
free exchange of ideas," like ISPs, but they have received no exemption from
copyright infringement liability. Id.
"' Id. To allow one class of ISPs to refuse to take responsibility would be to
encourage willful blindness. Id.
32Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
33See Shulman, supra note 1, at 592-93.
See infra notes 37-52 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 53-115 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 116-217 and accompanying text.
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I. THE INTERNET
The Internet began as a military operation called ARPANET, the
network of the Advanced Research Project Agency.38 This system
was designed to enable military computers to communicate with
university computers and defense contractors' computers, even if
portions of the network were destroyed in wartime.39 This system
set the example for the later development of several networks that
linked with each other and "now enable[s] tens of millions of
people to communicate with one another and to access vast
amounts of information from around the world."'
Users can access the Internet in many different ways. These
include networks provided by universities, corporations, and even
libraries and bookstores." In addition, several ISPs provide access
not only to the Internet, but to their own individual networks. 2
The Internet provides many different communication avenues,
including the World Wide Web, chat rooms, and newsgroups.43
These methods can transmit text, sound, photographs, artwork, and
video clips.' Newsgroups serve groups of subscribers, available
through Usenet, allowing messages to be read by thousands of
people at once, and providing for exchanges of information on
various topics.45 Newsgroups receive nearly 100,000 postings
every day.'
The World Wide Web, the most well known tool on the Internet,
is made up of various documents stored in different computers





42 Id. These services include America On-Line, Microsoft Network, Prodigy,
and CompuServe. Id.
41 Id. at 851.
44id.
45 Id.
46 Id. BBS operators automatically delete these postings "at regular intervals."
1010 [Vol 15
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worldwide.47 These documents include "webpages," which contain
information and allow the user to communicate with the website's
operator.' They also provide "links" to many other documents
around the Web.4 9  Using Transfer Connection Protocol
(hereinafter "TCP"), every connection to a webpage "retrieves a
copy of the specified file."5  Through a process known as
"caching," a browser that links to a webpage actually downloads
the information, and temporarily stores it in the computer's
memory51
Most Web pages allow free access, but some require
membership from one of the commercial ISPs.' The Internet, as a
whole, provides a large stage that is accessible to a world-wide
audience, and authors or publishers can choose to provide their
material to all of the Internet, or confine access to those who
purchase subscriptions.'
H. COPYRIGHT ISSUES ON THE INTERNET
With so much information so readily available at the click of a
mouse, it would seem a daunting task to provide adequate
copyright protection for it all. Notwithstanding its distribution
advantages for registered content, copyright owners still have




o See Major, supra note 3, at 82.
511d.
52 Reno, 521 U.S. at 852-53. This distinction is significant for finding
infringement liability. Major, supra note 3, at 95 (citing Sony Corp. of America
v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)). In Sony, the Supreme Court
held that videotaping televised programs was a fair use, in part, because the
copyrighted program was shown to the public "entirely free of charge." Sony,
464 U.S. at 449. From this holding, some have inferred that the fair use
exception would similarly protect free websites from infringement liability, but
might not so limit the liability of pay-sites. Major, supra note 3, at 95.
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unauthorized distribution" of their work.54 It would seem that an
underground movement of cyberspace "outlaws" has grown to take
advantage of this new medium, with its generous access to "free"
material, and this movement "neither understands nor respects the
concept of copyright."'5
Given the astronomical number of users who access the Internet
at one time or another, it would appear difficult for ISPs to monitor
and regulate Internet transmissions, for the sake of searching and
destroying infringing material.56 However, since they would play
the role of sheriff to the aforementioned outlaws, it is only fair that
they make a good-faith attempt to prevent copyright violations in
the global village as they invite new settlers to join.
Traditional copyright infringement law has found multiple areas
of liability: direct, and secondary infringement theories, which
include contributory and vicarious liability. These areas will be
examined separately.
A. LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT
DIRECT INFRINGEMENT
Direct copyright infringement requires (1) ownership of a valid
copyright, and (2) copying of the copyrighted material.5 7 Unlike
"' Monica P. McCabe, et al., Internet Copyright Infringement: Congress,
Courts Address Liability of Third Parties, N.Y. L.J., August 10, 1998,
Intellectual Property at Si. For a recent overview of the new amendments, see
David Goldberg & Robert J. Bernstein, An Expansive Set of Revisions, N.Y. L.J.
November 20, 1998, at 3.
" McCabe, et al, N.Y. L.J., August 10, 1998, at S1.
56Id.
" Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld, 991 F. Supp. 543, 550 (N.D. Tex.
1997), aff'd, No. 98-10097 (5th Cir. January 8, 1999). The Webbworld court
also held that the operator of a website that sold unauthorized copies of
photographs did not function "as a mere conduit." Id. at 552. Because
defendant "took affirmative steps" to infringe plaintiff's copyright, exercised
total control over its website's content, and was able to choose the newsgroups it
downloaded its pictures from, it was directly liable. Id. at 552-53. See also
Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 830-31 (C.D. Cal.
1998). In Michaels, a singer and an actress sued to enjoin the owners of an adult
website from digitizing and distributing a stolen videotape that depicted the two
[Vol 151012
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contributory infringement, knowledge or intent is absolutely
irrelevant to this cause of action.5" The material in question must
be original, must show sufficient creativity, and must be fixed "in a
tangible medium of expression."
59
A copyright certificate serves as prima facie evidence of
ownership, while copying is established when any one or more of
the copyright owner's six exclusive statutory rights have been
infringed.' However, because direct evidence of copying is
almost never available, a plaintiff usually satisfies that element by
proving that defendant had access to the protected work, and that
there was substantial similarity between the work protected and the
work appropriated." If the plaintiff is unable to prove access, he
plaintiffs together. Id. at 828-29. The court issued a preliminary injunction after
it found a clear case of direct infringement, and rejected the defense of implied
license. Id. at 830-31. See also Scanlon v. Kessler, I I F. Supp. 2d 444, 447
(S.D.N.Y. 1998). In Scanlon, a photographer sued a website operator for
displaying copyrighted photographs he had taken without crediting him as the
photographer. Id. at 446. Although the court did not find willful infringement,
it did find direct infringement. Id. at 447-48.
11 1d. (citing Religious Technology Center v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1367
(N.D. Cal. 1995)).
59See Shulman, supra note 1, at 566. See also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
o Webbworld, 991 F. Supp. at 550-51. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). This
section provides, in pertinent part:
[T]he owner of copyright has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical.., and other audiovisual
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of...pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
works ... including the individual images of a motion
picture ... to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly by means of digital audio transmission.
Id.
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can overcome it by showing not only a substantial but a "striking
similarity" between the work protected and the work
appropriated.62
An early case that successfully utilized this theory in the setting
of the Internet was Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena.63 Playboy,
the well-known gentlemen's magazine, brought actions for
copyright and trademark infringement against the operator of a
bulletin board service.' Defendant's bulletin board service
(hereinafter "BBS") contained unauthorized uploaded copies of
photographs that were originally published in plaintiffs
magazine.' Frena argued that he himself did not post those
pictures, but his subscribers did,66 and that as soon as he received
notice, he removed them.67
After finding that access and substantial similarity had been
established,68 the court held that Frena violated Playboy's
exclusive distribution and display rights.69 Frena's defense of fair
use' was rejected. The court analyzed the first factor of purpose,
62 Id.
63 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
6 Id. at 1554. A bulletin board service is a virtual message-board, accessible
by modem, that allows net-surfers to download pictures that other surfers have
uploaded (for a fee, in this case). Id. To download is to copy the image from
the BBS to a user's own computer's hard drive. Id. at 1554 n.l. To upload is to
transfer an image from a personal computer to a BBS. Id. at 1554 n.3.
65 Id. at 1554.
6id.
671d.
6 1 Id. at 1556.
69 Id. "There is no dispute that Defendant Frena supplied a product containing
unauthorized copies of a copyrighted work." Id. "Defendant's display of
[Playboy's] copyrighted photographs to subscribers was a public display.
Though limited to subscribers, the audience consisted of 'a substantial number
of persons outside of a normal circle of family and its social
acquaintances. ... "' Id. (citing 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 8.14[C], at 8-169 (1993)). See 17 U.S.C. § 101(1); §§ 106(3), (5)
(1994).
70 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). This section provides in pertinent part:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction ... for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching.., scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement on copyright. In determining whether the use
1014 [Vol 15
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and held that since the BBS was only available to those who paid a
monthly fee, the purpose of Frena's use was completely
commercial.71 With regard to the second factor, the nature of the
work, being entertainment and fantasy, also militated against fair
use.' With regard to the third factor, the amount of the taking, the
court found that appropriating the photographs from Playboy
magazine was taking the most essential part of the publication, no
matter how small the degree of taking. 3
The fourth factor, and one of the most determinative, is the
possible market effect on plaintiffs original work, as well as
derivative works.74 The court reasoned that this sort of copying
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors
to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use...
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.
Id.
7' Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1558. "One who distributes copyrighted material for
profit is engaged in a commercial use even if the customers supplied with such
material themselves use it for personal use." Id.
' Id. If a work is more appropriately characterized as entertainment, it is less
likely that a claim of fair use will be accepted. Id. (citing New Em Publications
v. Carol Publishing Group, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990)).
7 Id. The Frena court additionally stated that:
The Court is not implying that people do not read the articles
in [plaintiffs] magazine. However, a major factor to
[Playboy's] success is the photographs in its magazine. By
pirating the photographs for which [Playboy] has become
famous, Defendant Frena has taken a very important part of
[Playboy's] copyrighted publications.
Id.
4 Id. "'[A] proper application of fair use does not impair materially the
marketability of the copied work."' Id. The Supreme Court had held at one
time that this factor was the most important of the four. Harper & Row, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises, Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 566-67 (1985). More recently, the Court
has held that marker effect "is a matter of degree, and the importance of this
factor will vary, not only with the amount of harm, but also with the relative
strength of the showing on the other factors." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 n.21 (1994). While the Frena court held to the
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could have a negative effect on the market for Playboy's
publication by preempting its magazine sales.7 s The court then
held defendant liable for direct copyright infringement, reasoning
that intent or knowledge was an issue for damages,76 not for
liability.77
Notwithstanding the wide-open-spaces nature of the Internet,
copyright laws still apply to it.78  Nevertheless, many courts
declined to follow the example that Frena set forth.79 Rather than
find ISPs directly liable, certain courts elected instead to impose
the lesser sanctions of contributory liability and vicarious liability,
which impose liability on ISPs when their participation in the
infringing activities has only been indirect, or even passive. 0
Rose footnote as a modification of that rule. See Leibovitz v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 137 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1998) (recognizing that the Harper &
Row classification was "conspicuously absent" from the Acuff-Rose opinion);
Castle Rock, Inc. v. Carol Publishing, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145 (2d Cir. 1998)
(recognizing that the "Supreme Court has recently retreated" from holding that
the fourth factor of fair use was the most important).
75 Id. at 1559. Even if Playboy had not planned to post its own pictures on the
Internet, Frena's action uprooted demand for its published magazine, thus
denying plaintiff substantial revenue it would otherwise gain.
76See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1994).
' Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1559. The court granted summary judgment for
plaintiff on the copyright claim, as well as for trademark infringement and unfair
competition under the Lanham Act. Id. at 1563.
78See Major, supra note 3, at 93.
9 Monica P. McCabe, et al, Internet Copyright Infringement: Congress,
Courts Address Liability of Third Parties, N.Y. L.J., August 10, 1998, at S10.
o Id. Even when a website owner was found directly liable for copyright
infringement, this finding was distinguished from that of an ISP. While an ISP
would act as a mere provider of access, a website selling and repackaging
images obtained from newsgroups demonstrated the active involvement required
for a finding of direct liability. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld, 991 F.
Supp. 543, 552 (N.D. Tex. 1997), affd, No. 98-10097 (5th Cir. January 8,
1999). Additionally, a website owner has less territory to cover, and can
theoretically exercise more control and discretion over his small piece of
cyberspace than a BBS owner, or even an ISP. This is evidence of the trend to
find only secondary liability for ISPs that do not actively involve themselves
with the material that others transmit through their service. Since there is no
element of volition, directly liability would ultimately be unwarranted. See
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom Online Communication Services, Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
1016 [Vol 15
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B. SECONDARY LIABILITY THEORIES
In its original form, the text of the Copyright Act said nothing
about secondary liability. A provision for the acts of third parties
was added under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984,1
but this is not applicable generally to copyrightable works.' Case
law has stated, however, that even if secondary liability is not
expressly provided for in the statute, it still does exist, because it
has been imposed in practically every area of the law.'
Furthermore, giving the copyright holder the exclusive right "to
authorize" others to exercise his exclusive Section 106 rights
establishes liability against those who permit others to engage in
infringement without any authority of the copyright owner.'
Since the enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,"
secondary liability against ISPs has been nearly abandoned.6 The
following cases will illustrate how courts imposed secondary
liability before the amendments were enacted.
1. CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
A defendant is contributorily liable for copyright infringement if
he (1) "knew or should have known" about the infringing conduct,
81 17 U.S.C. § 905(3) (1994).
82 3 NIMMERON COPYRIGHT, § 12.04[A], at 12-66 (1998).
1 Id. (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,435 (1984)).
84 Id. at 12-66-67. See Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., 5 F.
Supp. 2d 823, 830-31 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that where musician and actress
held copyright for videotape of them together, and defendant could not raise the
defense of a non-exclusive license, defendant was liable for direct infringement).
See also Scanlon v. Kessler, 11 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding direct
infringement against a website that published unauthorized photographs).
8 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
6 The new safe-harbor provisions "protect qualifying service providers from
liability for all monetary relief for direct, vicarious and contributory
infringement." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 73 (1998), reprinted in 1998
U.S.C.C.A.N. 645, 655. See infra notes 217-51 and accompanying text,
explaining how the provisions of the new section expressly eliminate monetary
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and (2) "induced, caused or materially contributed to the infringing
conduct of another." 7 It can be established either by conduct that
furthers the infringement or by contribution of any tools that
"provide the means to infringe.""8 The United States Supreme
Court has long established the rule that one who intentionally and
purposefully participates in infringing actions, but does not
actually commit the infringing actions himself, is contributorily
liable. 9
Additionally, at least one commentator has opined that when one
furnishes facilities that allow for infringing copies of a protected
work to be made, and either knows or should know that another
intends to make infringing use of those copies, contributory
liability exists.' This test could be easily applied to include the
owners of a website or BBS that know or should know that their
facilities lend themselves to the making of unauthorized copies, but
nevertheless permit, or even encourage, the activity to occur.
' See Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 686 (N.D. Cal.
1994) (holding that even without actual knowledge of specific infringing
activities, defendant is liable for contributory infringement due to
encouragement, and provision of the means for others to infringe). See also
Shulman, supra note 1, at 571.
88 NIMMER, supra note 82, § 12.04[A][2], at 12-72. Occasionally, vicarious
infringement will not be found because the requirements of supervision and
direct financial benefits are absent. See id. § 12.04[A][2][a], at 12-73. Even so,
contributory liability may still exist, if the secondary actor in question acts with
knowledge, and his secondary acts serve to assist the direct infringer. Id.
89 Shulman, supra note 1, at 572 (citing Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S.
55 (1911)). The Second Circuit articulated the modem test used to find
contributory infringement. Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Management, 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971). A concert promoter was sued for
managing and promoting artists who performed songs that infringed plaintiffs
copyright. Id. at 1160. The court found him liable, holding that not only did he
know that the artists would directly infringe copyrighted works, but he provided
the space and time for them to commit the infringement. Id. at 1162-63.
90 NIMMER, supra note 82, § 12.04[A][2][b], at 12-75. Examples include the
operator of a duplication facility that allowed customers to duplicate copyrighted
audio tapes on blank tapes provided, even if the customers committed the actual
duplication. Id. (citing A & M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. 1449




Touro Law Review, Vol. 15 [1999], No. 3, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss3/9
THE INTERNET
Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA amply demonstrates this
point.9 In Sega, a BBS invited its subscribers to download the
programs to copyrighted video games available on its service, and
to purchase special software that would enable the subscribers to
save the games on their hard drives or floppy disks.9 The court
granted a preliminary injunction, 93 and found that this activity had
the effect of decreasing plaintiff's sales of the cartridges on which
it stored its own video games. 4 Therefore, the court granted a
preliminary injunction on the grounds of direct and contributory
infringement. 5 MAPHIA asserted the defense of fair use, but the
court rejected it, finding that all four factors weighed against
defendant.
However, when Sega subsequently moved for a permanent
injunction, the court' held that there was no direct infringement."
Although Sega had certainly shown that those who operated the
91 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
1 Id. at 683-84. The evidence showed that defendants charged fees for
downloading privileges, or gave certain privileges to those subscribers who
uploaded Sega games to their BBS. Id.
93Id. at 682.
9Id. at 684.
1 Id. at 686. The court held that uploading of game programs to the bulletin
board, and the subsequent downloading to users' computers was direct
infringement. Id. The court also cited to Frena for the rule that the provision of
facilities, knowledge, and encouragement of copying constituted contributory
infringement. Id. at 687 (citing Playboy v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1555-56
(M.D. Fla. 1993)).
9 Id. at 687-88. The purpose of making multiple copies of a game, so users
need not purchase additional cartridges weighed against fair use. Id. at 687. As
in Frena, when the nature of the work is more entertainment and fantasy than it
is fact or news, it weighs against fair use. Id. The amount/substantiality factor
was also not satisfied because the copies contained the entire game programs.
Id. Lastly and most importantly, the court found that should this unauthorized
copying become widespread, it would have an "immeasurable adverse effect on
the market" for Sega's copyrighted programs.
9 Judge Willken, the same District Judge who held that Sega had made out a
prima facie case of direct infringement for a preliminary injunction, wrote the
opinion.
98 Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
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MAPHIA BBS were aware of the infringing uploading or
downloading, it could not show that defendants "directly caused
the copying to occur."'  Therefore, the court concluded that
contributory infringement was the appropriate cause of action, not
direct infringement."°
Judge Willken then asserted that this order for a permanent
injunction was consistent with his earlier order, which granted the
preliminary injunction.1"' In the earlier order, the holding was that
someone had directly infringed Sega's games, and defendant
"knew, facilitated, and encouraged" the infringement."°  Judge
Willken stated that her earlier finding was that such conduct
specifically amounted to contributory infringement, but that no
equivalent finding was issued for direct infringement10 3 The court
also held that "[t]o the extent that order can be read to suggest that
[defendant] may be liable for direct copyright infringement, it is
clarified and superseded by this order.""' 4
"Id. at 932.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 932 n.5.
102 Id.
103 Id. The portion of the decision concerning direct infringement read:
9. Sega has established a prima facie case of direct copyright
infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501. Sega has established that
unauthorized copies of its games are made when such games
are uploaded to the MAPHIA bulletin board, here with the
knowledge of Defendant Scherman. These copied games are
thereby placed on the storage media of the electronic bulletin
board by unknown users.
Id. at 686. The court does not mention contributory infringement until Point 11
of the findings of fact. Id. Point 12 states that even if MAPHIA did not know
exactly when these game programs would pass through its BBS, its provision of
the facilities, and its encouragement of the infringing activity constituted
contributory infringement. Id. at 686-87.
104 The hearing for a permanent injunction came after another court in the
Northern District of California had decided Religious Technology Center v.
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). As will be shown, this case
resulted in a setback for copyright holders, as well as a grievous error in
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Nevertheless, the Sega court renewed its earlier finding that
MAPHIA was liable for contributory infringement."' s Direct
infringement had certainly been committed by the BBS users, but
contributory infringement was found to have been committed by
defendant, because defendant undisputedly had knowledge of the
users' infiinging conduct.1" The court found that providing the
facilities necessary for infringing activity was sufficient to
establish contributory infringement. 7  Additionally, defendant
"substantially participated" in this piracy by soliciting and
encouraging subscribers to upload illegally obtained game
programs, and advertising copying devices to make the copying
easier."o
2. VICARIOUS INFRINGEMENT
This form of liability does not require the plaintiff to prove
participation or knowledge."°9 The only necessary elements are
1 Sega, 948 F. Supp. at 932. "Although the Copyright Act does not expressly
impose liability on anyone other than direct infringers, courts have long
recognized that in certain circumstances, liability for contributory infringement
will be imposed." Id. (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d
259,261 (9th Cir. 1996)).
'06d. at 932-33.
"o Id. at 933 (citing Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264).
'01 Id. Because the court found contributory infringement to be sufficiently
established, it declined to address vicarious liability. Id. For the same reasons
as in earlier decisions, the fair use defense was found to be unavailing. Id. at
933-35. Additionally, the court found that the infringement, albeit not direct,
was willful, entitling Sega to statutory damages. Id. at 936. See 17 U.S.C. §
504(c)(2) (1994). However, the court refused to grant the maximum amount of
$100,000, finding that $5000 per infringement was the appropriate price for
video game piracy. Id. at 940 (citing Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Dragon
Pacific Int'l, 40 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994)).
109 NIMMER, supra note 82, § 12.04[A][1], at 12-68. "Lack of knowledge that
the primary actor is actually engaged in infringing conduct is not a defense
under these circumstances." Id. See also Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
17
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that defendant (1) had "the right and ability" to exercise control
over the directly infringing party, and (2) also had a "financial
interest" in the activity."'
Vicarious copyright infringement has been defined under two
different theories: the relationship of a landlord and tenant, and the
conduct of a dance-hall operator."' A landlord who leases
property to a direct copyright infringer is not liable, because the
landlord relinquishes control of the property through the lease, and
receives no financial benefit from the infringing activity, apart
from the usual rent payments."'
However, a court may find a landlord liable for a tenant's
infringing conduct, if the landlord is involved with the infringing
conduct. Thus, if a landlord receives not only a flat rental fee from
Webbworld, 991 F. Supp. 543, 553-54 (N.D. Tex. 1997), af'd, No. 98-10097
(5th Cir. January 8, 1999).
11o See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996);
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
' See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262; see also NIMMER, supra note 82,
§ 12.04[A][1], at 12-69. This section provides in pertinent part:
[T]he lessor of a theater is not liable... for infringing
performances that may occur in the theater, nor is the landlord
of premises where infringing works are sold rendered an
infringer simply by reason of such relationship. By contrast,
the owner of a place of entertainment who actively operates or
supervises the operation of the establishment is liable for
infringements occurring on the premises. When an orchestra
engages in infringing performances, the owner and operator of
the premises may be held liable for such infringement,
although he pays the orchestra nothing, and grants to them the
exclusive right to select the music to be performed... [i]n
fact, cases have upheld liability under those circumstances
even when the infringing acts occurred without the owner's
authority, and against his orders (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 12-69-70. See also Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995);
Gershwin Publishing Co. v. Columbia Artists Mgt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1161-
62 (2d Cir. 1971).
12 See Shulman, supra note I, at 575-76 (citing Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d
686 (2d Cir. 1938)).
1022 [Vol 15
18
Touro Law Review, Vol. 15 [1999], No. 3, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss3/9
THE/NTERNET
a tenant, 13 but also part of the tenant's gross revenue, the financial
interest required for vicarious infringement is established.""
Likewise, dance hall operators are vicariously liable for
infringement by entertainers in their hall because "they exercise
control by leasing the premises or hiring the bands and receive
profits from patrons who pay to attend performances (emphasis
added).""1 5 Therefore, a plaintiff must prove that defendant has the
power to monitor and control users' postings, and also has a direct
financial interest in the infringing acts they commit. The
defendant will then be deemed to be a dance-hall operator rather
than a landlord.'16
As the next section will demonstrate, both contributory and
vicarious liability became the more preferred methods of finding
copyright infringement liability against ISPs.
M. RECENT TRENDS IN THE LAW
A STRANGER BLOWS INTO TOWN ... RTC v. NETCOM
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Services, Inc."7 was decided between the Sega preliminary
injunction order and the permanent injunction order, and may
"' Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L.
Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1963)).
114 William 0. Ferron et al., On-Line Copyright Issues: Recent Case Lm and
Legislative Changes, 14 No. 2 COMPUTER LAW. 14 (February 1997) (citing Roy
Export Co. v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 344 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
115 See Shulman, supra note 1, at 576. They can, however, be deemed to lack
such financial interest when the performer in question only pays the owners a
flat fee, and where the owners themselves pay the performers the entrance fee.
Ferron, supra note 114.
"6 See Shulman, supra note 1, at 577. Better yet, a landlord who receives
more than a flat fee from his infringing tenants. See Ferron, supra note 114.
See also Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376. "[A] landlord who has the right and
ability to supervise the tenant's activities is vicariously liable for the
infringements of the tenant where the rental amount is proportionate to the
proceeds of the tenant's sales." Id. Vicarious liability is not available when the
"landlord" rents space only on a fixed fee, that is independent from the tenant's
activities, because this does not amount to a direct financial benefit. Id.
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account for the difference in the two orders. Though we move to
the "sacred" from the "profane," this plaintiff faced the same
unlawful appropriation as those previously mentioned.
After Frena and Sega, President Clinton charged a commission
to implement his administration's "vision for the National
Information Infrastructure" and recommend amendments to the
Copyright Act."' This report found that ISPs are in a much better
position to stop copyright infringement at its source, and
recommended changes to benefit copyright holders, including strict
copyright liability for ISPs." 9 The report concluded that overall,
existing copyright legislation provided sufficient protection for
intellectual property in this new arena, but certain amendments
were needed to provide more copyright protection. 20 However, it
advised against limiting the infringement liability of ISPs. The
Commission feared that limited liability would encourage ISPs to
willfully permit infringement by subscribers, and to neglect any
attempt to prevent the risk of infringement through tracking tools
or even educating subscribers.' 2 ' As we will see, certain changes
were made, but not those envisioned."
The case that may have prompted these amendments was
Netcom."3  A former minister of the Church of Scientology 24
11' INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE, THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995). This report is better known as the "White Paper."
9 Id. at 117.
120 Id. at 211-12. The Group recommended that every digitized work be given
express protection whenever the work was e-mailed or uploaded or downloaded
to another location. Id. at 217 n.43. Most significantly, it sought to maintain the
strict liability standard against ISPs reasoning that even if they cannot monitor
all content in their system, booksellers have been held strictly liable for selling
books that infringed copyright. Id. at 116.
121 Id. at 122-23. Additionally, it reasoned that it could not identify all the
situations in which reduced liability was warranted. Id. See Gilsdorf, supra
note 12, at 636-40 for a concise summary of this report, which represented
persuasive authority in this area until recently.
122 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202(a), 112 Stat.
2860, 2877-86 (1998). See infra notes 216-50 and accompanying text.
123 907 F. Supp. 1361.
1024 [Vol 15
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began posting copyrighted Scientologist material on the
newsgroup'" alt.religion.scientology, for the purpose of criticizing
the church's teachings)26 This particular newsgroup was not
directly linked to the Internet, but it could be connected to it
through Netcom, an ISP. 7
RTC tried reasoning with their brother-turned-astray, and then
asked Netcom to keep him off its system.'2 The service responded
by requiring proof from plaintiff that it owned the copyrights,
which plaintiff rejected as unreasonable.22 Neteom also argued
that removing this infringer from the Internet would mean denying
access to everyone who subscribed to the newsgroup. '
After RTC commenced suit, and Netcom moved for summary
judgment, the court considered all three levels of liability.' The
court held that there was no direct liability, because Netcom did
not actually perform the copying itself.' The court reasoned that
holding Netcom directly liable would be unreasonable and would
create too many separate acts of infringement 33  The court,
refusing to follow Frena, stated that the newsgroup does no more
than automatically create a copy at the direction of others. The
court also required a higher showing of volition or causation than
Frena deemed necessary."3
Moreover, the court held that storage of infringing copies on the
BBS, and retransmission to other storage facilities did not directly
124 The Church of Scientology is a religious organization founded on the
writings of L. Ron Hubbard, author of such books as DANETIcs and ETHics
AND THE CONDITONS.
11 A newsgroup is a BBS that is linked onto a worldwide network called
Usenet. They are accessible through America On-Line, as well as other ISPs.
"'26 Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1365-66.




131 Id. at 1367.
'32 d. at 1368.
'
33 Id. at 1369.
l1 Id. at 1370. The court also held that Netcom's failure to heed warnings
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violate the right to reproduce'35 when a third party who actually did
commit direct infringement, uploaded the copies (as the Netcom
court interpreted it).13 6 The Netcom court also rejected the Sega
court's preliminary finding of direct infringement, reasoning that
the reference to defendant MAPHIA's knowledge of infringing
activity lent itself to contributory, and not direct, infringement.'"'
The Netcom court went on to distinguish Frena on its facts,
holding that unlike some other ISPs, 38 Netcom did not "create or
control the content" that its subscribers were able to view and
transfer. 3 9 All Netcom did was provide access' 40 Because the
subscriber committed direct infringement, the court rejected a rule
that could find "countless parties" liable, when their only role was
setting up a system that was "necessary" for the Internet to
function.'
In addition, the Netcom court distinguished between those ISPs
which simply provide access and those which create their own
content in addition to providing access to the Internet and
Usenet.'42 It would seem that before the Copyright Act was
amended on October 28, 1998,' 4' the well-known ISPs such as
135 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994).
'36Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1370-71.
'3 Id. at 1371. "[K]nowledge is not an element of direct infringement." Id.
See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. The Netcom court reasoned that
Judge Willken was most likely referring to the direct infringement of the
subscribers to MAPHIA's BBS, not defendant itself. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at
1371. See Sega v. Sabella, No. C 93-04260 CW, 1996 WL 780560, at *6-*7
(N.D. Cal. December 18, 1996).
"3' See Shulman, supra note 1, at 559 n.26.
139 Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372.
" Id. The Netcom court further held that:
Finding such a service liable would involve an unreasonably broad construction
of public distribution and display rights. No purpose would be served by
holding (access providers) liable ... even though they might be in some sense
helping to achieve the Internet's automatic 'public distribution' and the users'
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America On-Line and CompuServe were on notice that Netcom
could not and would not apply to them.'"
The court, however, did find a question of fact regarding
defendant's liability for contributory infringement. 45 Here, the
court began to borrow the "landlord" distinction from the theory of
vicarious liability, finding that there was a degree of control that
Netcom held over the use of its system."4 The court found that
defendant was not aware of the infringement before plaintiff
notified it, but it "knew or should have known" about it after the
notification.'47
Notwithstanding the requirements of inducement and causation,
the Netcom court required substantial participation. 4  Because
defendant did not completely give up its control of its premises,
and could have easily taken the appropriate action to stop the
infringement, the court dismissed defendant's summary judgment
claim against contributory infringement.
Although the court found a question of fact on the contributory
infringement issue, it still discussed the claim of vicarious
infiingement.'49 It found an additional issue of fact concerning
Netcom's ability to control the actions of its subscribers, but
rejected plaintiffs claim that defendant received a direct financial
benefit from the infringement, since defendant only received fixed
fees from its subscribers.' s°
4 Netcom and Netscape do not provide voice recordings that "Welcome"
subscribers as they sign on, or announce "You've Got Mail!," as America
Online does. This makes America Online much more than a passive conduit, or
an owner of a copying machine that allows others to make their own copies.
145Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
'46 Id. at 1374.
147 d. See Sega v. Sabella, No. C 93-04260 CW, 1996 WL 780560, at *7-*8
(N.D. Cal. December 18, 1996).




5 0 Id. at 1376-77. Plaintiff argued that Netcom still received a benefit from its
refusal to take any action against its infringing subscribers, thus attracting them
to use their service. The court, however, rejected this argument. Id. at 1377.
The plaintiff introduced a statement of Netcom's attorney that defendants feared
that they would lose business if they took any action against the directly
infringing subscriber in question. Id. The court held that even if this evidence
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The Netcom case, in distinguishing Frena and reinterpreting
Sega, marked a turning point as to the governance of this uncharted
territory. Even if the ISP could not be held directly liable without
affirmative infringing conduct, it could still be held liable on a
secondary basis for allowing copyright infringement to take place
through its system. In other words, the sheriff would not be
charged as an accomplice for allowing the bank robbers to get
away, but he would be charged with obstruction of justice for
letting them rob the bank once he received word of their intentions.
While this would not provide the same level of deterrence as direct
infringement, it would still supply a substantial amount of
incentive to keep the ISPs focused on protection of copyright.
It should be noted that the Netcom court relied upon the district
court's opinion in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., which
was later reversed by the Ninth Circuit. 5 On appeal, the Fonovisa
court expanded the element of direct financial benefit for the
purpose of vicarious infringement, and held that providing
facilities was a material contribution to another's infringing
conduct.'53 In Fonovisa, a California flea market charged daily
rent to individual vendors, charged parking fees to customers,
provided parking, and maintained the right to terminate any lease
at will.)" The flea market was well aware that vendors were
selling bootlegged recordings of Latin American songs on its
premises.' However, when an action was brought for all three
levels of liability, the trial court found that vicarious liability was
not met because the collection of a flat rental fee was not a direct
financial interest in copyright infringement activity. 5 6 Likewise, it
directly financially benefited from the infringement. Id. In the end, the case
was settled before reaching trial. See Shulman, supra note 1, at 561.
151 847 F. Supp. 1492 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
152 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'gFonovisa, 847 F. Supp. 1492. This case
dealt with a flea market, rather than the Internet itself, but it is relevant on the
issues of vicarious and contributory infringement. See Shulman, supra note 1, at
585.
.53 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
154 Id. at 261.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 262. The trial court held that the flea market acted "as an absentee
landlord," having relinquished control of its rented property. Id.
[Vol 151028
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concluded that contributory infringement was not satisfied because
renting booth space did not constitute substantial participation."
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. 8  With regard to
contributory infringement, the court held that by providing "a site,
plumbing, utilities, parking, advertising, and customers for the
illicit sales," the flea market had materially contributed to their
lessees' activities.15 With regard to vicarious infringement, the
court found that the flea market had broad authority to police the
premises, whether they actually fulfilled this duty or not." The
court also held that, like dance hall operators, the flea market
benefited from the number of customers who were attracted to
their site to purchase pirated material.11
Based on this more recent development, Mary Ann Shulman
uses her comment to apply the Fonovisa rule to the Netcom fact
pattern.1" She theorizes that a court applying Fonovisa would find
that an ISP had the right to control by its right to terminate a
subscriber's account, and enforce contractual duties that forbade
copyright infringement by any subscriber." However, her
assertion that this analysis cannot be used against an ISP because
of the volume of material received, and the lack of physical
borders to the Internet appears questionable. 64 According to
Shulman, the right to control is a separate sub-element from the
ability to control, and Fonovisa simply combined them both."6 In
arguing that ISPs might not have the ability to control the
premises, she expresses uncertainty over the satisfaction of this
157 t. at 264.
159 76 F.3d 259.
159 Id. at 264. The court held that it would not be as easy to conduct the
infringing activity had there been no swap meet. Id.
160 Id. at 262-63.
1 Id. at 263-64. "Besides the flat fee Cherry Auction collected for booth
rental, the court found that the swap meet operator collected admission fees,
parking fees and concession sales, flowing directly from customers who came to
buy the counterfeit recordings at bargain basement prices." Id. at 264.
"6 Shulman, supra note 1, at 509-99.
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element." This argument seems to beat a hasty retreat,
considering that the ISP could not assign itself the right to control
if it lacked the ability to control.
In finding a direct financial benefit for vicarious liability,
Shulman noted how much revenue the flea market took in from
infringement-seeking customers. 67 Likewise, she correctly noted,
a court would find that an ISP such as Netcom received a direct
financial benefit from the increase in memberships and
subscriptions, even if they were flat fees.'68 She concluded that if
the Fonovisa rule were applied in Netcom, in spite of the
differences between both cases, defendant Netcom would have
been found vicariously liable. 69 Perhaps she wished to illustrate
the arguments of both sides, but in doing so, she only succeeded in
illustrating that the argument against vicarious liability for ISPs is
incorrect. Even though she disagreed with applying the law of
Fonovisa to a Netcom scenario, she had no choice but to admit that
a court hearing such a case still would apply it.
The new amendments still provide a small allowance for
vicarious liability in the areas of websites, chatrooms, and links,
that is unavailable for conduit or caching functions. 70 However, as
will be discussed, the vicarious liability in question will be applied
according to Netcom, not to Fonovisa.1
71
" Id. at 593. This is clearly an error. According to Nimmer, vicarious
liability is not confined to control over the physical premises where the
infringement occurs. NIMMER, supra note 82, § 12.04[A][1], at 12-71.
Additionally, a sponsor of a broadcast who does not control the program's
content cannot be liable for the program's infringement, but it may be if it had
"the power to supervise and control" the program's content. Id. at 12-72.
167 Shulman, supra note 1, at 594.
I ld. Once again, Shulman tried to retreat from her own proposition that the
swap meet analogy is accurate. She argued that ISPs do not receive additional
revenue from subscribers who download infringing material. Id. Additionally,
an increase in subscribers would not benefit Netcom itself, because many other
Usenet message boards had the same material posted. Id. In spite of these weak
attempts to justify some type of immunity for ISPs, Shulman ultimately cannot
profess them to be the winning arguments. Id.
1691 d. at 595.
7 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202(a), 112 Stat.
2860, 2879-81 (1998).
171 See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
[Vol 151030
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Other commentators have suggested that the two cases are more
easily reconcilable Although the flea market was aware of the
infringing activity, knowledge is an element of contributory, not
vicarious infringement." Additionally, both Netcom and Cherry
Auction received financial benefits from transactions that were not
related to the infringing conduct. 74 However, under Fonovisa, an
ISP that takes in advertising fees whenever subscribers hit certain
sites en route to other content could be liable if that content
includes infringing material. 5 Certainly, this ad revenue is more
of a direct financial benefit to an ISP than parking fees that
infringement-conscious customers paid to Cherry Auction. 6
Moreover, if an ISP has the ability to monitor any content in its
system, the requirement of control could be satisfied." This view
correctly finds that ISPs can profit directly and substantially from
activities that they have the ability to control, thus exposing them
to vicarious liability.
Still, another school of thought rejects Fonovisa's applicability
to the Internet's digital setting.'7 The argument is that an ISP
should not be treated the same as dance hall operators or flea
market owners for the purpose of determining vicarious liability."
However, this argument fails because it is based on the reasoning
that most ISPs charge subscribers for time, rather than for the
" Keith Stephens & John P. Sumner, Catch-22: Internet Service Providers'-
Liability for Copyright Infringement Over the Internet, 14 No. 5 COMPUTER
LAW. 1, 5 (May 1997). Cf Ian C. Ballon, Pinning the Blame in Cyberspace:
Towards a Coherent Theory For Imposing Vicarious Copyright, Trademark and
Tort Liability for Conduct Occurring Over the Internet, 18 HAsTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 729,748 (Summer 1996).
" See Stephens, supra note 172, at 5. See Relgious Technology Center v.
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing NIMMER, supra note
82, § 12.04[A][1], at 12-70).
174 Stephens, supra note 172, at 5. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,
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actual material reviewed, be it infringing or otherwise." ° This is
faulty reasoning because it then puts the ISP in the position of a
landlord, who charges rent for the time a tenant "leases" the
premises, but still has direct control over the premises, rather than
acting as an "absentee." Moreover, the argument that the physical
area of a flea market is easier to patrol than material posted online
also fails, because ISPs still have the "the greatest ability to control
the infringement (emphasis added)."'
181
Even after Netcom, the issue was not yet decided completely.
There would still arise several cases that would try to retain strict
liability for copyright infringement, consistent with the White
Paper's recommendations. A similar fact pattern emerged in
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Hardenburgh, Inc.182 Once again, a
bulletin board service operator was sued for copyright
infringement,'83 but this defendant controlled access to his BBS, as
well as "the conditions under which information [would] be
downloaded or uploaded."" 4  Defendant encouraged his
subscribers to upload information to his BBS, by allowing free
downloads in exchange for each upload. 5 Once an item was
uploaded, one of defendant's employees would inspect it to ensure
it was neither pornographic, nor protected by copyright."
Apparently hoping for the same success as his predecessors in
interest, defendant argued that the infringing Playboy photographs
were posted by subscribers, not by employees, and that defendant
had taken no part in the infringing activity.' Additionally, they
argued that a finding of liability would place impenetrable barriers
180 Id, at 748 n.72.
' Daniel R. Cahoy, Comment, New Legislation Regarding On-Line Service
Provider Liability for Copyright Infringement: A Solution in Search of a
Problem?, 38 IDEA 335,359 (1998).
982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
I3 Id. at 505.
,8 Id. The local bulletin board service was distinguished from larger
commercial ISPs, only by the fact that the commercial ISPs provided e-mail and
chat rooms at a larger scale than Hardenburgh did. Id.
'l Id. at 506.
186 id.
'87 Id. at 507.
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in computer technology by forcing defendant to inspect all of its
systems for infringing material, a supposedly "impossible" task.'M
Ultimately, the court granted summary judgment for plaintiff,
finding direct as well as contributory infringement." Defendants
pursued the tried-and true conduit defense, asserting that they were
merely "passive providers of the space in which the pictures were
passed from one party to another."' 9 They also argued that the
right of public display 9" was not infringed, because the subscribers
could only view the downloaded pictures "on their own computers
in the privacy of their own home .... ""
Playboy argued, however, that defendant was on notice that
plaintiff strictly enforced its copyrights, but defendant exhibited
"willful blindness" to the strong probability of infringing
photographs being uploaded to their system." 3 Since defendants
viewed every photograph that was uploaded before displaying it on
the BBS, that was enough participation to establish the "volitional
element" Netcom had required as an element of direct
infringement." The court agreed, and found direct infringement,
while remaining consistent with Netcom.
The Hardenburgh court cited to Frena, an early victory for
Playboy Enterprises, and made note of the fact that Frena was
"even more of a passive participant" in the exchange of materials
than Hardenburgh was, but he was still found directly liable.'" It
reasoned that the Frena court "apparently felt that a finding of
direct copyright infringement does not carry with it a volitional
1 Id. at 508. Defendant argued that its employees could inspect an uploaded
file, but could not trace the source of every single uploaded file to ensure against
infringement. Id. at 510.
119 Id. at 515.
190 Id. at 509.
191 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (1994).
'9 Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. at 509. See Religious Technology Center v.
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
193 Id. at 510.
194 Id. See Religious Technology Center v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372
(N.D. Cal. 1995). See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
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element, or, if it does, that such requirement was satisfied by
defendant's past action of setting up the BBS (emphasis added)."'"
The court next cited to Sega, describing the findings as unclear
on direct infringement, but explicit on contributory infringement."9
The court cited the confusing passage in question from the order
for a preliminary injunction, 98 and construed it to mean that since
"knowledge is not an element of direct infringement, the court
seems to be saying, as in Frena, that the mere creation of a BBS is
sufficient to establish direct infringement liability .... "'99
The court then cited to Netcom, which required an element of
volition or causation for direct infringement." The Hardenburgh
court accepted this Netcom rule, reasoning that an infringer must
actually engage in one of the six exclusive rights enumerated in
Section 106, which did not include "[s]etting up a computer
bulletin board." 01  Additionally, the court held that simply
encouraging infringing activity is also not outlawed by the statute,
and liability for such encouragement was only actionable under the
theory of contributory infringement.2 2
Nevertheless, the Hardenburgh court found direct liability based
on defendant's encouragement of subscribers to upload files, and
its own screening procedure. 23 These activities satisfied the
element of volition and active participation that was required.2"4 In
so holding, the court stated that it was "inconsistent to argue that
one may actively encourage and control the uploading and
dissemination of adult files, but cannot be held liable for copyright
violations because it is too difficult to determine which files
1% Id.
9 See supra notes 89-106 and accompanying text.
'9' Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 686 (N.D. Cal. 1994).




203 Id. at 513. See Creative v. Cyrix, No. C 97-0912 CW, 1997 WL 337553, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 1997) (finding a probability of infringement for the
purposes of preliminary injunction, where defendant "directly copied" the
material in question by placing copies on its website, in addition to contributory
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infringe upon someone else's copyrights." 5 This should not be
taken as an overruling of Netcomn, however, because the volitional
requirement imposed by Netcom was present and accounted for in
Hardenburgh.' Now, under the new amendment, if an ISP does
not commit this volitional act itself, it will not be held liable for
damages under either theory.' 7
The Hardenburgh court also found contributory liability, under
the Ninth Circuit's disposition in Fonovisa, 3 where providing the
space, and attracting would-be infringers to visit, was sufficient to
establish liability. The court found that defendant "induced,
caused, and materially contributed" to the infringement that took
place, and had constructive, if not actual knowledge, that Playboy
would enforce its rights against BBS owners.21 Under the new
statute, this form of liability would be practically unavailing.2t
Playboy Magazine would continue its temporary post-Nelcom
winning streak in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc."'
In this case, a website, accused of infringement, asserted the
205 Id. However, the court still borrowed the elements of vicarious and
contributory infringement as support for its holding of direct infringement. Id.
"Defendants had control over files ... and ... knew that there was a possibility
that [Playboy] photographs were being uploaded onto the system, but failed to
adopt procedures which ensured that any and all [Playboy] photographs would
be discarded." Id. Defendants were found liable for not one, but two violations
of exclusive rights, namely, distribution, and public display. Id.
205 See supra note 198-200 and accompanying text.
207 Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202(a), 112 Stat. 2860, 2877-86 (1998). Under
subsections 512(a) and (b), ISPs qualify for liability limitation for conduit
transmissions and system caching if the material transmitted or otherwise made
available was originated by "a person other than the service provider." Id.
§ 512(a)-(b), 112 Stat. at 2877-79. Perhaps traditional direct liability is a weak
link in the amendment's chain. See infra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
The only other weak link is that of vicarious liability, but this is not available for
every function mentioned in the act. § 512(c)-(d), 112 Stat. at 2879-81.
20
' Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
20 Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. at 514.
210Id.
211 § 512(a), 112 Stat. at 2877-78.
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Netcom "mere conduit" defense.213  The court rejected
Webbworld's defense, because its main function was not to
provide users access to the Internet, but to offer adult images, for a
price."' Additionally, its function as a "merchant," repackaging
pictures into thumbnails215 and selling images obtained from
newsgroups was not that of a "passive conduit of unaltered
information." '216 Therefore, the court found direct liability.2"'
Although it seemed that the tide was beginning to turn back to
findings of direct infringements for ISPs, Netcom apparently had
more of an effect on Congress than Hardenburgh, Webbworld,
Fonovisa, or even the White Paper did.2"' These small victories for
a well-known magazine did not guarantee victory for copyright
holders as a whole, as the new law was about to be passed.
Apparently, it had ramifications that went above and beyond what
Netcom had provided. That case limited the application of direct
213 Id. at 552.
2 14 
Id.
215 A thumbnail is a small picture or icon placed on a website, that produces a
larger, full-screen version when clicked on by a user's mouse.
216 Webbworld, 991 F. Supp. at 552.
217 Id. at 553. The court also held each individual defendant vicariously liable,
having found a direct financial benefit, as well as the "right and ability to
supervise." Id. at 553-54. Unlike the approach Shulman took in her comment,
the court found that vicarious liability concerned the "right and ability" to
control, not "the actual exercise of control." Id. at 554. Notwithstanding the
fact that one of the defendants refused to exercise this authority, his right and
ability to use it invited vicarious liability. Id.
218 The Netcom case was eventually settled, and the terms of the settlement
would eventually become part of the new amendment. See Ballon, supra note
172, at 766-69. Netcom adopted guidelines for responding to allegations of
copyright infringement by subscribers. Id. at 766. They were "obviously
drafted to limit Netcom's liability for contributory copyright infringement," but
were thought to set an example for other ISPs to enact their own infringement-
prevention guidelines. Id. at 767. The guidelines merely established a virtual
"complaint department" to review complaints from copyright owners who
believed that their rights were infringed. Id. They were to provide a copy of the
work, and enough notice of the violation for Netcom to locate the alleged
infringement. Id. If Netcom found that a prima facie claim of infringement had
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liability, but Congress would limit the application of all liability, at
least for damages.
IV. LIMITED LIABILITY
In his comment, Daniel Cahoy explains that the post-Netcom
state of affairs was adequate to deal with this area.21 9 Based upon
his review of the case law, he concludes that since contributory
infringement, not direct infringement, was the method of liability
that ISPs would most likely have faced under Netcom, there is not
as much of a cause for concern as some would think.'
He then examines the legislation, which was then pending, and
demonstrates that the idea of passing such a law would be
premature. t He explains that enacting legislation to protect the
Internet's necessary functions is a natural reaction. 2
Nevertheless, this protection is unwarranted without a show of
actual harm, of which the ISPs have experienced none.m
Furthermore, "attempting to codify judicial doctrine that is not yet
fully formed binds the hands of the judiciary and may lead to
unanticipated problems for both on-line content and service
providers."224
Most importantly, Cahoy states that this legislation would
"eliminate the incentive to curb infringement created by Netcom
and tilt the balance strongly in favor of OSP's." Since ISPs
219 Id.
I Id. at 350. He also explains that vicarious liability may depend "on the type
of service the OSP provides." The BBS operators seen in all three of the major
cases would face liability greater than that of a mere web-browser, like
Netscape. Id. Since Cahoy's comment was written before the amendment
passed, it can only be examined in hindsight.
221 Id. at 353.
222 Id. at 354. Many wanted to enact legislation in response to the White
Paper's recommendation of strict liability for ISPs. Id. at 352-53. Moreover,
some wished to receive a direct answer from Congress, not the courts, in this
area. Id. at 353.
" Id. at 354.
I ld. His words would prove prophetic, because the Fonovisa rule had not
yet been applied to the Netcom scenario.
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would not be liable for monetary damages for either category of
secondary liability (in certain situations), and such damages would
operate "as the greatest deterrent," there would be little incentive,
if any, for ISPs to even attempt to stop copyright infringement.226
"Without the threat of (monetary) liability, the party with the
greatest ability to control the infringement is, effectively, out of the
game."2 7
Even if Netcom were the rule of law, overturning Frena and
Hardenburgh, at least some liability would still be available, and
ISPs would make it their duty to seek out and destroy any acts of
infringement to purge themselves of this liability. While some
would say that an ISP that acts to stamp out infringement may face
more liability than one that does not,228 this liability would serve to
encourage their efforts and provide incentive to stop such
infringing acts. Faced with the possibility of losing revenue, ISPs
would be more motivated to protect copyrights. Now that the safe-
harbor provisions have been approved, Congress has effectively
told ISPs to neglect the rights of intellectual property owners.
On October 28, 1998, President Clinton approved the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act.229 This new legislation amended the
Copyright Act by implementing the World Intellectual Property
Organization's Copyright Treaty, and claimed to "provide certainty
for copyright owners and Internet service providers with respect to
copyright infringement liability online." '  This article is most
concerned with Title II of this amendment -- The Online Copyright
226 Id. at 358.
227 Id.
228 See Ballon, supra note 172, at 763. "The fact that a company like Netcom
may be able to detect and remedy some acts of infringement does not mean that
it should be penalized, and held to a higher standard, for those acts of
infringement it did not detect." Id. Why Netcom would rather remedy some,
instead of all, infringement, is a mystery.
229 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
2o S. REP. No. 105-190 (1998), available at 1998 WL 239623. "In short, Title
II ensures that the efficiency of the Internet will continue to improve and that the
variety and quality of services on the Internet will expand." Id. In a "classic
legislative compromise," Congress agreed not to pass either measure (WIPO)
without the other (online limited liability). Monica P. McCabe, et al, Internet
Copyright Infringement, N.Y. L.J., August 10, 1998, at S1.
1038 [Vol 15
34
Touro Law Review, Vol. 15 [1999], No. 3, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss3/9
THE NTERNET
Infringement Liability Limitation Act, which adds Section 512 to
Chapter 5 of the 1976 Copyright Act.3
The new amendments provide that ISPs will "not be liable for
monetary relief' for copyright infringement for facilitating transfer
of unmodified material (originated by another party)," for caching
material, 3 storage of material on a server,' providing links to an
infringing location,, 5 or for disabling access to infringing material
in good faith. 6 Instead, it only provides for certain types of
injunctive relief."7 If it is for non-conduit conduct, an injunction
may only be issued that prevents the ISP from providing access to
an infiinging website within its system, or cancels an infringing
subscriber's account, or provides any other relief deemed
necessary." If it is for conduit conduct, injunctions are only
available for canceling a subscriber's account, or to "block access
0 to a specific, identified, online location outside the United
States. '' 9
2 Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202(a), 112 Stat. at 2877-86. For an overview of
the respective arguments of ISPs and copyright owners leading up to the
enactment of this amendment, see supra notes 10-30 and accompanying text.
Since Section 202(a) of the amendment adds Section 512 to the Copyright Act,
it will be referred to hereinafter as 512, rather than 202(a).
232 § 512(a), 112 Stat. at 2877-78.
23 § 512(b), 112 Stat. at 2878-79. "Caching material" is defined as
"intermediate and temporary storage of material ... through an automatic
technical process for the purpose of making the material available to
users .. request access .... ." See id.
2 § 512(c), 112 Stat. at 2879-81 (providing that upon the required notice, the
allegedly infringing material is removed). If the ISP has sufficient control over
this material, but directly profits from any infringement, it will be liable for
damages. § 512(c)(1)(B), 112 Stat. at 2880.
235 § 512(d), 112 Stat. at 2881. Likewise, vicarious liability may provide
damages in this subsection. s 512(d)(2), 112 Star at 2881.
236 § 512(g), 112 Stat. at 2882-83. This limitation does not apply to removed
material posted on a subscriber's home page. However, it does apply if the ISP
notifies the subscriber, informs the subscriber it will replace the material in 10
business days upon receipt of counter-notice, and does replace it. See id. at
2882.
137 § 512(j), 112 Stat. at 2884-86.
23 § 512(j)(1)(A), 112 Stat. at 2885.
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Subsection (a) of this new act is intended to apply to activities in
which the ISP functions as a "conduit for the communications of
others."'  Liability is limited if the communication in question
was initiated by a "person other than the service provider," and is
copied through an automatic process."4 Additionally, any copy of
the material being transferred or routed through the ISP must
remain on the system only as long as needed to be transmitted to
the intended recipient, and the material must not be modified
during transmission.242
Subsection (b) prevents liability for "caching," another form of
copying. This practice is used to store material on the ISPs server
to reduce Internet traffic, and "facilitate access by subsequent
users" so time will not be wasted in securing the original item.243
To qualify, the storage, like the conduit transmissions, must be
carried out through an automatic technical process that does not
allow for modification of content.2 4" Additionally, it cannot
interfere with technology of the material in question, such as a
record of "hit counts" on a website.2 5
Under subsection (c), liability is also eliminated for any
infringement that is alleged to take place in material that is placed
in storage at a user's direction on an ISP's system.246 This applies
to users' web pages, or chat rooms, or other material that is hosted
on server space by the ISP.247  If the ISP has no actual or
constructive knowledge of any infringing activities in such areas, it
is not liable, but once it becomes aware of such an action, it must
act quickly to remove the infringing material.248 If the ISP has the
24oH.R. REP. NO. 105-551(11) (1998), available at 1998 WL 414916.
241 Id.
242 Id. There cannot be any modification or selection of the material by the ISP
itself, in order for this to be a conduit function.
243 Id. For a more thorough examination of this process, and its implications
for copyright infringement, see Richard S. Vermut, File Caching on the
Internet: Technical Infringement or Safeguard for Efficient Network
Operation?, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 273 (Spring 1997).
244 § 512(b)(1), 112 Stat. at 2878.
245 H.R. REP. No. 105-551 (HI).
246 § 512(c), 112 Stat. at 2879-8 1.
247 H.R. REP. No. 105-551(11).
24' § 512(c)(1)(A), 112 Stat. at 2880.
[Vol 151040
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"fight and ability to control" the presence of infringing activity
within its domain, it must not receive "a direct financial benefit
directly attributable to the infringing activity." '249 This section also
requires that each ISP designate an agent to receive notifications of
infringement claims in order to be eligible for the liability
limitation. Each of these notifications must be delivered to the
agent, written and signed, identifying the work alleged to be
infringed and the infringing work, as well as a certification of a
good-faith belief that the work was infringed. "
This subsection does not require an ISP is to affirmatively
inspect or monitor its service for infringing activity, but applies a
"red flag" test to determine awareness of infringement. 2S  A
subjective standard as well as an objective one determine this.'n
When awareness of "red flag" infringement is established, the ISP
must act as quickly as possible to remove the material, or risk
losing the liability limitation. This requirement would seem to
leave open the possibility of contributory infringement, but only if
the ISP does not immediately remove the material from such
websites.
249 § 512(c)(1)(B), 112 Stat. at 2880. Fortunately, in this area, vicarious
liability still exists. However, the legislative history behind this act insists that
monetary liability for all three types of copyright infringement has been limited.
H.R. REP. No. 105-551(11). Moreover, the legislative intent indicates that
regular payments for a service, as a "landlord," would not constitute a benefit
"directly attributable to the infringing activity," but fees that are paid for the
sake of "access to infringing material" would constitute vicarious liability. Id.
See also S. REP. No. 105-190 (1998), available at 1998 NVL 239623. This
would appear to sharpen the landlord/dance hall dichotomy, but courts are
advised to take a "common-sense, fact-based approach, not a formalistic one," in
finding such liability. Id. This negates Fonovisa even before it is applied to a
Netcom-like case.
250 § 512(c)(3), 112 Stat. at 2880-81.
2' H.R. REP. No. 105-551(11).
I Id. An ISP would fall under the limited liability umbrella if it lacked
"actual knowledge" of infringement, or was not "aware of facts or circumstances
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Subsection (d) limits liability for linking or referring users to an
infringing site through a directory, index, or hypertext link. 4 A
legislative report supporting this law noted a concern that an ISP
might be exposed to monetary liability if it actually views the
infringing site that it provides a link to, since this subsection uses
the same awareness requirements as subsection (c).2 5 However,
the legislative intent of the amendment indicates that there would
only be a "red flag" if the site the ISP linked to had stated
obviously that it was a "pirate" site.25'6 Therefore only those
directories that referred users to pirate sites would be barred from
the safe-harbor provision,257 greatly militating against contributory,
as well as vicarious, infringementY
8
254 § 512(d), 112 Stat. at 2881. This subsection incorporates the same notice
provisions as those used for storing space on a server. See id. § 512(c)(1), 112
Stat. at 2879-80.
25 H.R. REP. No. 105-551(11). This subsection also provides a window of
opportunity for vicarious liability. § 512(d)(2), 112 Stat. at 2881.
256 H.R. REP. No. 105-551 (11). This section provides in pertinent part:
Absent such 'red flags' or actual knowledge, a directory
provider could not be expected, during the course of its brief
cataloguing visit, a directory provider would not be similarly
aware merely because it saw one or more well known
photographs of a celebrity at a site devoted to that person. The
provider could not be expected, during the course of its brief
visit, to determine whether the photograph was still protected
by copyright ....
Id. Since this test requires ISPs only to police links to those sites that blatantly
advertise their piracy, perhaps it requires more of a fluorescent pink flag than a
red flag.
2Id.
15 § 512(d)(2), 112 Stat. at 2881. "A service provider shall not be liable for
monetary relief... if the service provider ... does not receive a financial
benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the
service provider has the right and ability to control such activity. . . ." Id. See
also § 512(c)(1)(B), 112 Stat. at 2880. It could be argued that if an ISP can see
that the link led to an infringing location, then the ISP has the "right and ability
to control" the directory to the site. Even if the site in question does not
advertise its illegal conduct, the conduct can still be recognized. This would
establish the knowledge needed for contributory infringement, and the control
needed for vicarious infringement. However, no incentive is given to prevent
ISPs from encouraging infringement to occur, or encouraging web-surfers to
click on the infringing link.
[Vol 151042
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Additionally, subsection (g) provides immunity for providers
who remove or disable material based on the aforementioned
good-faith belief that the subject matter is infringing copyright.5 9
This subsection also allows for the user whose material has been
disabled to file a counter-notification with the ISP's agent, stating
a good-faith belief that the work is not infringing, and consenting
to the jurisdiction of the local federal court in the accused user's
home district."
Lastly, subsection (m) clarifies what is implicit in the earlier
subsections: limited liability is not conditioned upon any duty of
the ISP to affirmatively seek out copyright infringement on its
service."'
The new amendments only allow for ISPs to have their potential
liability limited if it performs one or more of the above
functions.2 62 Additionally, the ISP must implement a policy that
terminates the accounts of all subscribers who are repeat infringers,
but does not interfere with common technical practices used to
"identify or protect copyrighted works."263
With regard to conduit acts in subsection (a), the amendment
operates to codify Netcom and overturn Frena.2'  Under this new
act, the mere provision of a facility that allows other
159 § 512(g), 112 Stat. at 2882-83.
260 § 512(g)(3), 112 Stat. at 2883. Upon receipt of counter-notification, the ISP
has 10 days to notify this subscriber that it will replace the material, and replace
it within 14 business days after receipt of counter-notification, unless the ISP's
agent receives notice from the complainant that a court order against the alleged
infringer has been filed. § 512(g)(2), 112 Stat. at 2882-83. This counter-
notification must substantially comply with the statute, which requires the same
information as the notification that alleges copyright infringement. HKR REP.
No. 105-551(11).
261 § 512(m), 112 Stat. at 2886. The legislation was supposedly "not intended
to discourage the service provider from monitoring its service for infringing
material." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 73 (1998), reprinted in 1998
U.S.C.C.A.N. 645, 655. However, it was clearly not intended to encourage ISPs
to police their areas either.
26' Monica P. McCabe, et al, Internet Copyright Infringement, N.Y. L.J.,
August 10, 1998, Intellectual Property at S1.
263 § 512(i), 112 Stat. at 2884.
264 David L. Hayes, Application of Copyright Rights to Specific Acts on the
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communications to pass through would not constitute direct
infringement.265 However, the amendment goes further than
Netcom and nearly eliminates monetary remedies for all forms of
copyright infringement except direct liability.2" Several of the
cases mentioned above did not find direct liability for merely
providing access to the actual infringers, but they still imposed
secondary liability for allowing this conduct to continue.
However, a court hearing such a case today could only issue the
minimum injunctive relief of ordering the ISP to block access to
the infringer in question. The Frena court did find direct
infringement, but only a handful of subsequent cases were willing
to find direct infringement without more overt action. Certainly
Frena's actions would not have been "direct" enough to remove
him from the safe-harbor provisions.
In Sega, contributory infringement was eventually found, with
the knowledge prong clearly satisfied. Because defendant clearly
knew of the content of the postings, and certainly encouraged
sbscribers to post them, the BBS would remain liable for damages.
However, such clear cases would not be so easily found under
the new act. In Netcom, the question of fact concerning vicarious
liability would be resolved in favor of the ISP. Even though the
act actually does allow for monetary damages for vicarious
infringement for material stored on a system by a subscriber,267 it
does not allow for such liability for conduit and caching functions.
Now that the legislative history behind the act appears to have
deflected any effect the rule of Fonovisa would have had on a
Netcom scenario, vicarious liability would require a heavier burden
than anticipated.268 It states that "where the infringer makes the
265 Id.
2 6 § 512(a) provides that as long as the ISP does not perform any action that
modifies the material, it is exempt from liability. Practically the only liability
that remains, besides a small window of opportunity for contributory
infringement in subsections (c) and (d), is for a clear finding of direct
infringement, satisfied by a finding of volition. This would only apply when the
defendant clearly acted to directly infringe, rather than merely provide access.
See Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 830-31 (C.D.
Cal. 1998); Scanlon v. Kessler, I 1 F. Supp. 2d 444, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
267 § 512(c)(1)(B), 112 Stat. at 2880.
26
8 See supra notes 162-81 and accompanying text.
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same kind of payment as non-infringing users of the provider's
service," simply receiving monthly fees from a direct copyright
infiinger would not establish vicarious liability. z9
While it is true that other cases, such as Hardenburgh and
Webbworld, disagreed with Netcon and found direct infringement,
it is questionable how the new act would apply if those cases were
heard today. All pertinent sections of this act protect those ISPs
which do not possess actual or constructive knowledge. They also
require the ISP's to act quickly and in good faith to remove
infiinging material. Certainly the defendants in Michaels and
Scanlon would find the amendments unavailing, but the outcomes
of Hardenburgh and Webbivorld would be uncertain. The text of
the new statute mentions nothing about liability for encouraging
others to infringe, so it is likely that defendants such as in
Hardenbaugh would be able to successfully argue that such
activity does not warrant monetary liability.27 0 Furthermore, this
solution is not the panacea that Congress and the ISPs believe it is,
because the infringing subscribers removed by the injunctions
could easily register with another ISP and continue their activities.
Though this amendment was only recently passed, it had been
debated in Congress for several years, and not all were in favor of
the idea of preemptive legislation governing this area. 7' While
some believed that legislation was needed to provide a balance
between intellectual property rights and free access to
information,2 ' and to clarify the liability that ISPs would or would
not face,273 others thought that such a measure would be
unnecessary. 274
269 H.R REP. No. 105-551(11) (1998), available at 1998 WL 414916.
270 If Webbworld were heard today, it is possible that they would still be held
liable, because they did receive a direct financial benefit.
271 See Cahoy, supra note 18 1.
2See Gilsdorf, supra note 12, at 675. See also Hayes, supra note 264, at 10.
273 Hayes, supra note 264, at 20. "Because of the overlapping nature of
copyright rights when applied to the Internet, news definitions and divisions of
these rights will probably be necessary for online usage of copyrighted works."
Id.
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In his comment, Daniel Cahoy explains that the post-Netcom
state of affairs was adequate to deal with this area.275 Based upon
his review of the case law, he concludes that since contributory
infringement, not direct infringement, was the method of liability
that ISPs would most likely have faced under Netcom, there is not
as much of a cause for concern as some would think.
2 76
He then examines the legislation, which was then pending, and
demonstrates that the idea of passing such a law would be
premature.277 He explains that enacting legislation to protect the
Internet's necessary functions is a natural reaction. 278
Nevertheless, this protection is unwarranted without a show of
actual harm, of which the ISPs have experienced none.279
Furthermore, "attempting to codify judicial doctrine that is not yet
fully formed binds the hands of the judiciary and may lead to
unanticipated problems for both on-line content and service
providers."28
Most importantly, Cahoy states that this legislation would
"eliminate the incentive to curb infringement created by Netcom
and tilt the balance strongly in favor of OSP's."28" ' Since ISPs
would not be liable for monetary damages for either category of
secondary liability (in certain situations), and such damages would
operate "as the greatest deterrent," there would be little incentive,
if any, for ISPs to even attempt to stop copyright infringement.2
275 id.
276 Id. at 350. He also explains that vicarious liability may depend "on the type
of service the OSP provides." The BBS operators seen in all three of the major
cases would face liability greater than that of a mere web-browser, like
Netscape. Id. Since Cahoy's comment was written before the amendment
passed, it can only be examined in hindsight.
277 Id. at 353.
278 Id. at 354. Many wanted to enact legislation in response to the White
Paper's recommendation of strict liability for ISPs. Id. at 352-53. Moreover,
some wished to receive a direct answer from Congress, not the courts, in this
area. Id. at 353.
279 Id. at 354.
2" Id. His words would prove prophetic, because the Fonovisa rule had not
yet been applied to the Netcom scenario.
281 Id. at 355.
'82 Id. at 358.
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"Without the threat of (monetary) liability, the party with the
greatest ability to control the infringement is, effectively, out of the
game., ' s
Even if Netcom were the rule of law, overturning Frena and
Hardenburgh, at least some liability would still be available, and
ISPs would make it their duty to seek out and destroy any acts of
infringement to purge themselves of this liability. While some
would say that an ISP that acts to stamp out infringement may face
more liability than one that does not," this liability would serve to
encourage their efforts and provide incentive to stop such
infringing acts. Faced with the possibility of losing revenue, ISPs
would be more motivated to protect copyrights. Now that the safe-
harbor provisions have been approved, Congress has effectively
told ISPs to neglect the rights of intellectual property owners.
What can copyright owners do about this? They are warned to
establish procedures that will help them identify "infringements of
their works on-line,'"' and to set standards for copyright
protection geared to this specific technology.2 6 This suggestion
seems to compensate little for the knowledge that ISPs already
have their own tools and abilities to prevent copyright
infringement on their systems, but they will not be held liable for
monetary damages if they choose not to use them.' Injunctive
283 Id.
284 See Ballon, supra note 172, at 763. "The fact that a company like Netcom
may be able to detect and remedy some acts of infringement does not mean that
it should be penalized, and held to a higher standard, for those acts of
infringement it did not detect." Id. Why Netcom would rather remedy some,
instead of all, infringement, is a mystery.
28 Monica C. McCabe, et al, Internet Copyright Infringement, N.Y. L..,
August 10, 1998, Intellectual Property at SI.
286 1d.
28 "Section 512 is not intended to imply that a service provider is or is not
liable as an infringer either for conduct that fails to so qualify. Rather, the
limitations of liability apply if the provider is found to be liable under existing
principles of law." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-796, at 73 (1998), reprinted in
1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 645, 655. "Nothing in this section shall be construed to
condition the applicability of [the safe-harbor provisions] on. .. a service
provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating
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relief is insufficient because, as stated above, monetary damages
provide a greater incentive for ISPs to police their areas.
Furthermore, exposure of works to unchecked infringement
deprives their owners of the income they would be entitled to from
authorized reproductions, distributions, or displays."' 8 Thus, the
rule of law no longer exists out here in the Badlands -- perhaps it
really is everyone for themselves!
This legislation will have drastic consequences. As Joan
Gilsdorf correctly points out, not only will ISPs have little
incentive to protect copyrighted works, the authors of those works
will lose incentive to create if their products are not adequately
protected.2"9 Even if it is a monumental task for ISPs to monitor
communications on their systems, that task is a product of the
supervisory power they possess over their system that no other
entity has. While some ISPs clearly do operate as "mere
conduits," many perform more functions than secondary
transmission.29 Caching may be an automatic function of the
Internet, and may be considered to be just as innocuous as the
conduit function. However, the functions of storing space on an
ISP's server and "linking" are clearly not automatic and do not
deserve the same protection as transmission and caching.
These limitations would seem to have the effect of encouraging
settlements, since damages and attorney's fees would not be
available at trial. 29' The legislative history behind this momentous
legislative action states that it "ensures that the efficiency of the
Internet will continue to improve and that the variety and quality of
services on the Internet will expand."2" More likely than anything,
the result could mean that the urge to produce original and creative
material on the Internet, where this material could enjoy a greater
audience than ever before, will be chilled to the point of complete
288 Gilsdorf, supra note 12, at 634. "If the doctrine of fair use... [is] not
applicable in a given situation, then copyright owners should be able to prevent
unauthorized distribution of their works over the Internet, and they should be
able to receive reasonable fees for the use of their works." Id.
289 Id. Notwithstanding the incentive the ISPs will have to avoid anything
resembling direct infringement.
290 Id. at 633.
291 McCabe, N.Y. L.J., August 10, 1998, at SI.
292 S. REP. No. 105-190 (1998), available at 1998 WL 239623.
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suppression. This is the opposite effect of the Constitutional intent
to grant Congress the power "to promote the progress of science
and useful arts.293
The Supreme Court has previously rejected the rationale of
allowing "the services of the Internet to expand" as a legitimate
interest in regulating the Internet.2' In Reno v. A.C.L.U., the
Government asserted the same purpose as their motivation behind
passing the Communications Decency Act.295 The Government
assumed that the availability of material that was supposedly
"obscene" or "indecent" was driving concerned citizens away from
the Internet.296 The Court cited to the record that the "dramatic
expansion of this new marketplace of ideas" to contradict the
Government's argument. It therefore held that the constitutional
interest in encouraging freedom of speech outweighed any
"theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship."
29
Similarly, Congress has now put forth a law protecting an
unproven benefit of holding ISPs virtually harmless from any form
of copyright infringement liability.29 While it is justified to
provide the most liability limitations for the conduit function,2' it
still limits much of the liability that would otherwise be imposed
upon active infringement participants."
293 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
294 S. REP. No. 105-190.
295 Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997). This
statute outlawed "the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent messages to
any recipient under 18 years of age" over the Internet. Id. at 859. Rationalizing
that the Internet was not comparable to any older form of broadcast media, the
Court struck down this statute as violative of the First Amendment. Id. at 864-
68. See 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp.II 1996).
296 Id. at 885.
297 Id.
29' As stated above, the only "harm" that ISPs were affected by was the
issuance of the White Paper.
299 Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-304, § 202(a), 112 Stat. 2860,2884-85 (1998).
30 § 512 (j)(1), 112 Stat. at 2885. Both subsections provide for blocking
access to an infringing subscriber and/or website. Id. However, where the
liability is for infringement through the ISPs conduit function, access can only
be blocked if the infringing website is "outside the United States."




Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1999
TOURO LAW REVIEW
Congress may not be taking the same restrictive route that it did
in passing the Communications Decency Act, but allowing
infringing actions to go unchecked does not make for a fairer
practice. Instead of eliminating monetary liability for every
function that can be done on the Internet, the act should only
protect the conduit functions of websites and newsgroups, and the
caching functions of servers.3"1 Under the post-Netcom rule, an
actor who engages in active participation should be left open to all
three areas of liability. According to the statute, if the ISP initiates
the transfer of infringing material by itself,3" modifies the content
of such material,0 3 makes "cached" material available online by
itself," does not "act expeditiously to remove" infringing material
that it knows about (or has reason to),3 5 or directly profits from the
infringement when it "has the right and ability to control" it,3" the
limitations of liability will not be available. However, the statute
allows for ISPs' liability to be limited regardless of whether they
solicited the activity.
For example, when an ISP engages in the type of conduct
illustrated in Michaels and Scanlon, the statute would provide no
protection because the ISP posted the infringing material itself. In
simpler terms, unless an ISP directly infringes copyrighted
material itself, or directly profits from allowing others to infringe,
and the plaintiff can successfully prove that no other party
performed or allowed the infringement but the ISP, the defendant
will not be held liable for monetary damages.
Granted, many have said that the earlier copyright laws were
adequate for Internet liability, but were not easily enforced." 7
3o While caching does entail some affirmative conduct by the ISP, it operates
mostly as an automatic process, as conduit does.
302 § 512(a)(1), 112 Stat. at 2878.
m § 512(a)(5), 112 Stat. at 2878.
304 § 512(b)(1)(A), 112 Stat. at 2878.
3 § 512(c)(1)(A), 112 Stat. at 2880.
3 § 512(c)(1)(B), 112 Stat. at 2880. See also § 512(d), 112 Stat. at 2881.
31 Judith Saffer, Legal Issues of Broadcasting on the Internet: Licensing on
the Internet, 14 TouRo L. REv. 21, 22 (Fall 1997). "Realistically, given the
private, market-driven nature of copyright enforcement, the copyright laws will
never be fully enforced." Id. at 22 n.59 (citing Jayashri Srikantiah, The
1050 [Vol 15
46
Touro Law Review, Vol. 15 [1999], No. 3, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss3/9
THE INTERNET
Nevertheless, simply conceding that they are difficult to enforce,
and in effect doing away with them, is not the answer to solve
these quandaries of dealing with a new technology. What needs to
be produced is stricter copyright regulations, not ones that are
more lax. Therefore, the best approach for copyright owners is to
send this new legislation back from whence it came: lobby
Congress to repeal it.
Congress must understand that the way to "limit liability" on the
Internet is to give would-be infringers reason not to undertake
liability in the first place. It must understand that the avoidance of
litigation is best accomplished when the action causing liability
does not occur. These "solutions," of merely permitting the ISPs
to refrain from searching for infringement, requiring them to stop
infringement only when it becomes glaringly obvious, and
exempting them from monetary liability, do not provide any
remedy for copyright infringement.
303
Alternatively, copyright owners could consider forming a
plaintiff class to bring an action under similar theories as Reno v.
A.C.L. U 309 That case can be used either as a sword or a shield in
relation to the Internet. Reno used the Constitution as a shield
against undue restrictions on the freedom of speech on the Internet.
Perhaps it can also be used as a sword to attack the lack of
restrictions on copyright infringement on the Internet.30 In this
case, we are upholding the constitutional rights of the copyright
owners, and reinforcing the constitutional duty that Congress has
to enforce on the Internet, the same as any other medium.31 '
Response of Copyright to the Enforcement Strain of Inexpensive Copying
Technology, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1634, 1646 (1996)).
"s See Cahoy, supra note 181, at 360. The former system limited "the liability
of OSP's to a level where they [could] operate efficiently and profitably while
maintaining the incentive to curb truly egregious infringement. Disturbing this
system merely provides a solution which is in search of a problem." Id.
0 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
3 Io d. at 882. Instead of protecting ISPs from any real or perceived "sword of
Damocles," the Court should allow for the concern over monetary damages,
mandated by the 1976 Copyright Act since its inception, to operate as an
incentive to protect the rights of intellectual property owners.
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Alas, Congress may have the power to reserve and enforce
copyrights, but it is not forced to exercise this power if it chooses
not to do so. This would prove troubling in petitioning for
certiorari if the matter is not resolved at an earlier stage of the
litigation. Perhaps the "cumulative effect" doctrine could be
argued, especially since infringing copies can be transmitted
around the world in seconds, but this may not be sufficient to
nullify the statute.
Congress may not be restricting the Internet, but it is certainly
not safeguarding the proprietary interests of those who use it,
either. Had case law been permitted to develop without any
legislative interference, it would have retained monetary damages
for contributory infringement. It is this evolving case law, not the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which should govern Internet
copyright infringement.
In conclusion, case law, and the Copyright Clause of the United
States Constitution, do not support the recent amendments to the
Copyright Act. Therefore, greater protection should be given to
the good citizens of Dodge, to protect them against the infringing
"varmints" of the Internet. This means that would-be sheriffs
should not be permitted to decline to protect copyrights. Netcom
may have held that ISPs should not be directly liable for merely
providing the passive communication facility in which
infringement takes place, but it also held that any act of volition or
inducement connected with infringement was an act of liability. It
never allowed the ISPs to get out of Dodge before sunset, so
Congress should not indulge them this luxury either.
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